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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the mediation analysis is to investigate how perceived behavioural control mediates the 
relationship between the cash and tax incentives towards the intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund. A 
quantitative approach was adopted analysing 384 responses collected through a nationwide multistage 
proportionate cluster sampling. A nonparametric sampling procedure using bootstrapping following the 
Preacher and Hayes technique in mediating analysis were employed. The specific indirect effect from the 
bootstrapping result concluded that tax incentives influence the saving intention via perceived behavioural 
control, in contrast to cash incentives which is not significant. Predicting a person’s intention to save in a 
voluntary retirement fund is an important issue, and the findings of this study would have practical implications 
on policymakers and commercial marketers alike, as it would help to encourage retirement savings through 
voluntary funds to prevent financial insufficiency in the golden age.  
Keywords: Voluntary Retirement Fund, Social Security, Retirement savings, Financial Incentives. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since its inception in 2010 and 2012, the voluntary private retirement saving programs have not been 
successful in Malaysia, despite the incentives such as tax deductions on contributions and a potential 
higher return than the provident fund. In June 2013, a year after its inauguration, the number of 
accounts created in the PRS, for example, was around 30,000. In the year 2014 budget, the 
government had proposed a one-off incentive to RM500 to contributors who participate in the PRS 
with a minimum cumulative investment of RM1,000 within a year. In October 2014, the number only 
rose to 100,000 accounts with a net asset value of RM299.82 Million since the introduction of 
incentives (http://www.sc.com.my/). In the 2017 an increment of the youth incentives up to RM1000 
was made. The account holder of PRS tripled to 301,279 in 2017. After almost five years of operation, 
the net total asset value rose to from RM229.82 million in 2013 to RM2.23 billion in 2017 
(http://www.sc.com.my, PPA). Much of the success comes from of the cash incentives provided by 
the PRS, the promotion and the concerted effort done by the 56 existing private fund organisations led 
by the PPA. However, this is pale in comparison to the Malaysian sole mandatory fund, the EPF 
annual contribution which rose by 6.38% in 2017 from the previous year which amounted to 
RM65.52 billion against a total withdrawal of RM49.40 billion. This result in a net inflow of 
RM16.12 billion, which increase the total investment assets of EPF to RM768.51 billion as at Dec 
2017 (EPF).  
One of the significant benefits of saving in a voluntary retirement fund is its financial 
incentives. Financial incentives are direct financial stimuli such as subsidy, tax concession or tax 
deferral available to purchase and to save in a retirement plan which encourage participation and 
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increase the level of contributions (Attanasio et al., 2013;  Feng, 2018). In many countries, the 
existence of the financial incentives is an aspect that sets apart the voluntary retirement fund and other 
types of old age savings (Holzmann, 2000).  Many authors attest to this indicating voluntary 
retirement fund rely heavily on the incentives [4]–[9]. The incentives theory suggest that human 
actions are often inspired to gain from external reinforcement or incentives.  Most people will be 
pulled towards behaviours that offer positive incentives and pushed away from behaviours associated 
with negative incentives [10]. The differences in an individual’s behaviour can be traced to the 
incentives available and the value a person places on those incentives at the time [11]. Financial 
incentives can be considered as a facilitating condition mechanism towards retirement saving. Many 
researchers attest to this and provide evidence of the existence of financial incentives in encouraging 
retirement saving in a private or voluntary scheme in almost every country of the world (Feng, 2018; , 
[7], [12]–[19]. Accordingly, the same intervention is conducted in Malaysia to promote voluntary 
saving for retirement.  
In many instances the ability of rewards or incentives to modify behaviours is undeniable. It 
is stated that if people receive payments for certain behaviours, the expectation is that they are likely 
to engage in these desired behaviours [20]. Most economist and behaviourist believe in this view, but 
the cognitive psychologist views it differently [21]–[23]. Economists and behavioural scientist 
consider performance-based reward can stimulate cognitive effort, a psychologist on the other hands 
argue that imposing financial incentives will distract or crowd out intrinsic motivation. Psychologist 
often argues that intrinsic motivation is sufficient to the moved individual to act. However, the 
differences lie on how the model was integrated when psychologist usually concentrated on how 
financial incentives might crowd out intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, economist focus on the 
trade-off between effort and incentives [24]–[26]. Incentives are useful if it stimulates behavioural 
changes. However, limited research found a positive relationship between tax incentives and 
participation with many have a different view on the magnitude of the incentives effect. Thus, this 
study seeks to examine the mediating effect of perceived behavioural control on the financial 
incentives (tax incentives and cash incentives) towards the intention to save in a voluntary retirement 
fund. 
 
 
Literature review  
 
Incentives 
Incentives are considered to be any concession, rebate, credit, subsidy or contribution the government 
makes, either directly or via an employer, towards an individual’s retirement income saving [27]. The 
financial incentives encourage savings for retirement usually divided into tax advantages such as tax 
deferral or performance-based incentives. In ways that the fruits of the incentives are only gathered 
when the task has been performed. In most cases, both contributions and returns on investment are 
exempted from taxes, while the payment is taxed. Parallel to the tax benefit, there are also other direct 
financial stimuli to increase saving such as flat or one time subsidies or matching grant.  
Building on the base established by Clark Hull’s Drive theories, incentive theories emerged in the 
1940s and 1950s [28]. The underlying assumption of the Incentive theory is the more individual is 
paid, the higher his effort. The principal-agent theory developed its main contribution to this 
assumption. Likewise, the Expectancy theory [29] for example posits that people will decide such a 
way to obtain the desired outcome since they expect to maximise their satisfaction by choosing that 
outcome. According to this theory when performance-contingent incentives are present, the 
motivation and effort of the subject will increase.  Bonner and Sprinkle [23] developed a framework 
to understand the factors and their effect on the relationships between motivation, effort, and 
performance. In their framework, cognitive and motivational mechanism act as a mediator in the 
relationship between monetary incentives and effort. According to them, a person, task, and 
environmental variables coupled with the incentives scheme variables moderate the monetary 
incentives-effort relation and the effort-task performance relation [25]. The link between the relation 
of financial incentives and performance is the effort which is the mental or physical activity to 
achieve something, and it may include many things. The effort includes developing strategy, devoting 
time to a task and physical effort.  Performance, on the other hand, is the actual level of how well an 
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individual does on a particular task or the actual result. In this case, the performance can be said to be 
similar to the intention or the behaviour of a person [23].   
The agency theory by Eisenhardt [30] assumes that human is motivated by self-interest, rational and 
are risk-averse. If the task does not increase their economic well-being, the individual will exert no 
effort. Looking at it positively, by providing incentives be it tax benefits of subsidies will increase the 
effort of the subject to save in a voluntary retirement fund. However, according to this theory, the 
interest of the agent (savers) and the principle (the governments/fund providers) must be aligned and 
that the financial incentives must be high enough to trigger the individual to perform. As such, 
crowding out can happen because of informational asymmetries. If an individual is uncertain about 
their ability, the value of the task or the character of the principle the incentives might create a 
negative signal that lowers the person intrinsic motivation [31]–[33]. According to Kamenica [8] 
monetary incentives can backfire which reduce the willingness to continue doing a task if the task is 
inherently interesting, and the task is noble, or paying too high wage or too low contingent for the 
successful completion of task which will lead individual to become so nervous that they will be 
unable to complete a task.  
Self-efficacy, as explained by Bandura [34] in his social cognitive theory, provides the basis 
for understanding the complex human motivation on incentives and their ability. A person with higher 
self-efficacy sets himself higher goals and have a stronger commitment to complete the task [35]. Due 
to a raised level of motivation, individuals are more likely to put more effort in tasks than people with 
low self-efficacy. The social-cognitive theory claims that monetary incentives make tasks more 
interesting motivate a higher level of effort and leads to better performance. In turn, the subject will 
have their skills increases and leads to increased self-efficacy [25]. 
According to Gneezy et al., [22] monetary incentives have two kinds of effects: the standard 
direct price effect, which makes the incentivised behaviour more attractive and indirect psychological 
effect which work in the opposite direction to the price effect and can crowd out the incentivised 
behaviour. Offering incentives may signal that achieving a specific goal is difficult and the task is not 
attractive, or the agent is not well-suited for it, thus require additional incentive or reward [22]. It can 
also connote that the principals do not trust the agent’s intrinsic motivation which signal negatively to 
the agent and can lower the intrinsic motivation of the agent to undertake the task.  At the same time 
crowding out can appear when extrinsic incentive reduces another motive for undertaking the task for 
example if a higher personal benefit associated with a certain level of prosocial behaviour affects the 
reputational value attributed to a person’s intrinsic and extrinsic motivation [22]. 
Financial incentives are considered an essential element in strategies to change prescribing 
patterns, although limited evidence of their effects can be found. Much of the literature focuses on 
whether the deferred taxes in defined contribution plans increase total retirement saving [1], [36]–
[40]. Ideally, financial incentives should have multi-effect towards retirement planning; to increase 
scheme take-up or increase contribution in the retirement fund, and at the same time increase long-
term individual and national savings and income. However, researchers have not come to a consensus 
on whether fiscal or financial incentives such as tax expenditure induces additional retirement saving 
or effective in providing a remedy for the private retirement market imperfection [41]–[44]. Indeed, 
whether retirement savings respond to any tax incentive is still questionable [41].  
In the United States, significant tax reforms were made in the 1980s to provide incentives and 
regulate contributions to retirement savings such as 401(K) and (Roth) IRA which generated a 
substantial increase in participation in the IRAs [45]. Similar to findings by  Bernheim [42] who argue 
that tax incentives may be indeed effective in favouring the participation and the amount of 
contributions to retirement saving plans. On the opposite, no consensus has been reached concerning 
the effect of tax incentives on private aggregate savings as well on the effects of these incentives on 
aggregate national savings overall. Poterba, Venti, and Wise [46] find that decreases in other financial 
assets do not offset 401(k) saving. They argued that 401(k) plans generate an increase in net 
retirement saving.  Disney, Emmerson, and Wakefield [47] consider the effectiveness of the 
Stakeholder Pension which guarantees tax reliefs proportional to contributions and where returns 
accruing to the plan are tax exempt, while withdrawals are subject to taxation is effective in increasing 
aggregate private retirement savings.  
Two Studies in Germany suggest a mixed view which the introduction of tax-favoured 
supplementary pensions reform in Europe. According to Börsch-Supan [48] tax relief increase the 
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household saving rate by 4 per cent, but with clear evidence of high substitution effect since it shifts 
saving into those channels with highest tax relief and small uptake rates. Corneo, Keese, and Schroder 
[49] analyse the effectiveness of the Riester Scheme reported that tax favoured mobilised private 
retirement savings, but with small effect, however, the share of households saving did not change 
significantly after the reform. Thus, indicating that the incentives do not stimulate additional saving, 
but only drives household to substitute non-subsidized to subsidised saving contract [50].  
On the other hand, a study by Ramnath [51] finds no evidence that low-income Americans’ 
retirement saving increases in response to the Saver’s Tax Credit.  Marino  [52] claim a sizable 
increase in the tax deductibility of retirement funds contribution not lead to a substantial increase in 
the retirement fund investment [52]. Only a small fraction of the funds going into tax-advantaged 
savings vehicles can be ‘new’ saving, and such policies are expensive ways of encouraging savings. 
Also, to the extent that the reshuffling of assets leads to a reduction in the tax liabilities without any 
real change in economic behaviour and a deadweight loss associated with such policies. Additionally, 
since those with the greatest reshuffling possibilities are the wealthiest members of society, these 
policies will typically have some distributional impact [1].  
Using a Danish data, Chetty [53] find that 85 per cent of savers are “passive:” their saving 
rate increases when it is done automatically.  This study also found that the marginal changes in tax 
incentives have little effect on high-income earners even when this group potential having the most 
substantial benefit from the tax treatment. Also, it is also found out that lower income earner saving 
behaviour is unlikely to be responsive to financial incentives [53]. The finding shows that offering tax 
incentives would mean the loss of revenue to the government, without significantly increasing 
retirement savings. Introducing a tax advantage to a saving instrument is equivalent to a modest 
increase in the rate of return on a particular asset. Many of these schemes are associated with a tax 
deferral or partial tax exemption, rather than being entirely exempt from taxes [1]. Several incentives 
were also introduced in Australia to encourage voluntary superannuation contribution but with less 
enthusiasm. The participation rate in voluntary contributions in Australia was reported to decrease 
which suggest a re-examination of the effectiveness of the tax incentives [6]. Jappelli and Pistaferri 
[54] reported a lack of response to the changes both in the decision to invest and the amount invested 
in the long-term life insurance market in Italy where tax incentives were promoted.  The research 
looked at the life insurance market in Italy where tax incentives changed for different income groups 
over the years [54].   
By comparing tax-favoured retirement saving plans between the U.S IRAs, the UK retirement 
saving plans Tax Exempt Special Saving Accounts (TESSAs) and Individual Saving Accounts, 
Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield [1] concluded that the IRAs is ineffective in generating new private 
savings. The same conclusion was also made for TESSAs which does not provide an apparent 
increase in net private savings, but rather a reshuffling of existing financial and real assets. Their 
conclusion stated that only relatively small fractions of saving going into the tax-advantage saving 
could be considered as new saving. It is supporting the finding by Engen, Gale and Scholz [55] which 
stated that most of the investment in IRAs or 401(k) accounts reflects asset shifting, and not creating 
new net capital accumulation.  
Saez [56] examine the effects of presentation and information on the take up of financial 
subsidies for retirement saving found out that subsidies raise take-up and contributions when more 
substantial effects when it is characterised as a matching contribution rather than an equivalent value 
tax credit (or cash back). The finding shows that real incentives and the presentation of those 
incentives affect consumer choices. Thus, one of the strategies used by many governments around the 
globe including Malaysia is to introduce financial incentives in term of matching grant, tax, 
exemption, tax deferral and subsidies. As for matching contribution, Madrian [57] shows that except 
some evidence from Germany and New Zealand, the effect of this type of incentive is minuscule in 
the United Stated and nonexistence outside of the US. Ofili [58] study shows that employer’s 
matching contribution incentive and other benefits that come with the retirement saving plan are 
insignificant towards the behaviour to participate in voluntary saving to those having high intention to 
save. On the other hand, the effect incentives towards non-saver are controversially the opposite, 
which leads to unfavourable behaviour regarding participation in the retirement saving plans. 
Jordon and Treisch [59] study indicated that tax benefit does not matter much, neither the 
general decision to invest for one's retirement, nor regarding the choice of a specific investment 
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product.  The investment decision for a retirement plan is primarily, but not exclusively motivated by 
worries about their state pension and the wish to maintain their standard of living in old age. Investors 
are also drawn by media reports, their trusted bank advisors or their friends, colleagues, and relatives. 
The also concluded that the only financial criterion that drew their intention to retirement plan was the 
prospect of somewhat higher returns than the ones to be attained on a riskless saving account  [59]. 
Hinz [60] explains that the extent of voluntary pension coverage is not indicative of the financial and 
tax incentives, instead of the limitations set upon the existing mandatory public pension system. The 
effect of financial incentives is dependent on the specifics of the system in the place where the 
research was conducted [15], [47], [61], [62]. The effect may be different in liberal social policy (as 
such in Malaysia) where the responsibility for pension adequacy is at the hands of the citizen 
compared to a conservative environment where contributions reflect previous earning or even more 
distinct in a social democratic system, in which states will provide for retirement [61].  
 
Saving Intention  
Saving intention, an analogue to behavioural intention is defined as an indication of an individual’s 
readiness to perform a given behaviour. It is a person’s subjective probability that he or she will 
perform a behaviour [63].  It is assumed to be an immediate antecedent or the proximal of behaviour. 
In this study, the behavioural intention is defined as an individual intention to save in the voluntary 
private retirement fund. It is operationalised as a conscious intention, plan or effort to save in a private 
retirement fund in accordance to TACT concept suggested by Ajzen [64]. In line with the 
conceptualization for this study, the intention was measured using 3 items adopted from Mahlanza 
(2015) and Croy (2010) to capture the respondent’s behaviour applying a common generalized 
method (Francis et al. 2004). The items in the intention scale generated internal consistency indicated 
by Cronbach’s alpha of 0.928 (N=334) for the 3 statements.  Ajzen [65] warned that the set of items 
for intention must show a high internal consistency with each other and this has been shown in the 
pilot study and the final study. Majority of the TPB items which were adopted from research by Croy 
(2010) and Mahlanza (2015) on retirement saving are reliable and demonstrated by high internal 
consistency, both in the pilot test and the current study. 
 
Perceived Behavioural Control Scale 
Perceived behavioural control determines the ability of the respondent to perform a behaviour. It 
reflects the belief regarding control over the factors that may facilitate or impede performance of a 
behaviour (Azjen, 1895, 1991; Taylor & Todd   1995, 1997). The PBC constructs which were not 
present in the TRA, will influence both intentions based on the assessment of the likelihood of success 
in performing the behaviour and is asserted as will also directly influence behaviour (Ajzen 1985, 
1991, Todd Taylor 1995, 1997).  The five items adapted from Croy (2010) and Mahlanza (2015) 
generated a 0.835 (N=334) Cronbach’s Alpha value.  
The purpose of the mediation analysis is to see how perceived behavioural control mediates 
the relationship between the predictor (Cash Incentive and Tax Incentives) towards the intention to 
save in a voluntary retirement fund as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Mediating Effect of Perceived behavioural control on Incentives towards Saving Intention 
 
Figure 1 shows that the Perceived Behavioural Control mediate the relationship between tax and cash 
incentives and the saving intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund. Both tax incentives and 
Tax 
incentiv
e 
Cash 
incentiv
e 
Perceived 
behavioural 
control 
Tax 
incentiv
e 
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cash incentives are measured as type of resources that facilitated the condition to save in the voluntary 
retirement fund. Prior research has shown that the effect of tax incentives and cash incentives towards 
saving in ambiguous [15], [47], [58], [61], [62]. The aim of this analysis is to gauge the effect of 
incentives as a facilitating condition in increasing an individual perceived control to save through 
their increase effort, ability and interest. The hypothesis for the mediating variables employing the 
transmittal approach [66] are as follow: 
H1:  The relationship between cash incentives and intention will be mediated by perceived 
behavioural control. 
H2: The relationship between tax incentives and intention will be mediated by perceived 
behavioural control. 
 
 
Methods 
 
A nonparametric sampling procedure using bootstrapping is recognised as a powerful method for 
testing mediating effect (Hayes, 2009, Zhao et al., 2010, Ramayah et al., 2018). Hair et al., (2013) 
suggested to follow the Preacher and Hayes technique in mediating analysis since it does not make 
assumption about the shape of the variable distribution or the sampling distribution of the statistic and 
can be applied to small sample size (Ramayah et al., 2018; Hair et al., 2017; Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). The survey questionnaire was made in English and was back to back-translated to Bahasa 
Malaysia and retranslated to English guided by language experts and was distributed to the selected 
organisation all over peninsula Malaysia in the first quarter of 2018. Before the translation process, 
the questionnaire went through a process to elicit the salient behavioural and outcome evaluation in 
part of items in the questionnaire. 60 respondents were chosen conveniently from Facebook with 25 
of them answered. The questionnaire was then proofread by six academics and two professionals who 
are an expert in the area to affirm the strength and the language of the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire where then pilot tested in fieldwork to 80 respondents with 39 returns to report the 
Cronbach Alpha which then was used to correct and make refinement to the questionnaire  
A suggested minimum sample size for a PLS-Sem analysis using the G-Power analysis (one-tailed, 
effect size=0.3, alpha err prob= 0.05, power (1-B err-prob= 0.85)) is 75 cases or using Chin [67] 10 
times per most substantial number of paths from the independent variable going into a dependent 
variable is 30 (constructs to attitude). The final questionnaire sent and data was collected from all over 
Peninsular Malaysia using purposive multistage cluster sampling. 1200 questionnaires were 
distributed by post to 120 agencies with a public-private sector ratio of 20:80 throughout the 14 states 
of the Peninsula. Sixty one agencies participated, and 484 questionnaires were returned. Upon 
refinement of the cases, 334 usable set were used for analysis after the deletion of the non-subject 
respondent, already have voluntary saving, straight lining unengaged respondent, missing value more 
than 10% or missing all items in single construct and items-based z-score outliers and Mahalanobis’ 
Distance multivariate outliers.  
The items and construct for this paper was a part of a larger survey focusing on the 
Decomposed Theory of Planned behaviour. The final questionnaire contains three sections. The first 
section is to collect demographic information; the second collects retirement portfolio. The third part 
collect information on the constructs of the DTPB model based on Todd and Taylor [68], [69], Azjen 
[65], [70], [71], Rogers [72], Bandura [73], and Triandis [74]. The items measure of perceived 
behavioural control are adapted from Croy [75], [76], Mahlanza [77] following the guidelines of Todd 
and Taylor [78]. Both tax incentives and cash incentives have three indicators (cash1 to cash 3 and tax 
1 to tax 3) each modified according to the operationalization suggested by (Bonner & Sprinkle [25]. 
All the items in the construct are reflective measure. The participants answered a completed 
questionnaire with 5 points Likert’s scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree, with no indicator 
in between) in the survey to measure the constructs. The initial Cronbach’s Alpha value for each 
construct met the 0.7 reliability [79]. However, some items are deleted from the final analysis due to 
poor loadings, lateral and vertical collinearity issue to fit the requirement in the PLS-SEM 
measurement model.  
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Result 
 
Measurement model 
 
Table 1 shows the final reporting of the model reflective measurement model.  The indicator loadings, 
CR and AVE of the reflective constructs in the model, shows most of the item’s loadings exceed the 
recommended value of 0.708 (Hair et al., 2017), except for PBC4RC. However, the loading for this 
item is still within the acceptable value if the summation of loadings results in high loading scores and 
contributing to AVE scores of greater than 0.6 [80]. All of the constructs meet the threshold value for 
CR > 0.7 and AVE > 0.5 after the deletion process [81].   
 
Table 1: Measurement Model 
  Items  Loadingsa Rho Ab CRc AVEd 
Perceived behavioural control PBC1 0.840 0.858 0.884 0.606 
PBC2 0.847    
PBC3 0.826    
 PBC4RC 0.642    
  PBC5 0.714       
Intention  INT1 0.922 0.929 0.954 0.874 
 INT2 0.957    
  INT3 0.926       
Cash Incentive Cash1 0.915 0.899 0.935 0.829 
 Cash2 0.910    
 Cash3 0.906    
Tax Incentives Tax1 0.912 0.903 0.938 0.834 
 Tax2 0.919    
 Tax3 0.909    
a. Items loadings > 0.5 indicates the indicator Reliability (Hulland, 1999, p. 198) 
b. Rho A > 0.7 indicates indicator reliability (Nunnally, 1978) 
c. Composite Reliability (CR) > 0.7 indicates internal consistency (Gefen et al., 2000) 
d. Average Variance Extracted (AVE) > 0.5 indicates Convergent Reliability (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; 
Fornell and Larcker, 1981) 
 
The discriminant validity is assessed again and shows that indicators load actively on their constructs 
than on another construct in the model. The accumulative average variance between each construct 
and its measures also is higher than the average variance shared between the construct and another 
construct [80], [82], [83]. The Fornell larcker criterion also exhibits sufficient discriminant validity in 
which the square root of the AVE is larger than the correlations for all another reflective construct. 
Discriminant analysis through the cross-loadings shows that all indicators load high on its construct, 
compared to the other constructs. The HTMT ratio discriminant validity in the model fulfils the 
HTMT.90 [84] which indicates that discriminant validity has been achieved satisfactorily.  
 
Structural model  
 
The inclusion of a mediating variable which have bi-directional relationship, requires the 
bootstrapping (Bias-corrected and Accelerated) technique using a two-tailed testing at a significant 
level of 0.05 as recommended by Preacher and Hayes’ [80], [85]. A statistically significant indirect 
effect with t-value > 1.96, two-tailed, p < 0.05 should be taken as an evidence for mediation [80], 
[83], [85] . 
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Table 2: Mediation Analysis: Total indirect effect  
Relationship Original 
Sample  
Sample 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation  
T Statistics  p-values 
Cash Incentives -> Intention 0.013 0.013 0.020 0.638 0.523 
Cash Incentives -> Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
     
Perceived Behavioural Control -> Intention      
Tax Incentives -> Intention 0.063 0.064 0.022 2.854 0.004 
Tax Incentives -> Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
     
 
Table 3: Mediation Analysis: Specific indirect effect  
Relationship   (β) 
Std. 
error 
T value  
Confidence 
Interval 
Decision 
LL UL  
H1: Tax Incentives -> Perceived Behavioural 
Control -> Intention 
0.063 0.022 2.905**
* 
0.027 0.113 Supported*** 
H2: Cash Incentives -> Perceived Behavioural 
Control -> Intention 
0.013 0.020 0.634 -0.025 0.054 Not supported 
***P<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1; p-values that correspond to the probability of erroneously rejecting the null 
hypothesis.  
- Commonly used critical values for two-tailed tests are 1.645 (significance level= 10%), 1.96 
(significance level = 5%), and 2.58 (significance level = 1 %) (Ramayah, et al. 2018; Hair et al. 2017). 
 
 
Table 2 shows the total indirect effect, while Table 3 shows the specific indirect effect. The specific 
indirect effect from the bootstrapping result concluded that only one indirect effect (Tax incentives  
perceived behavioural control  intention) with β =0.063 is significant with t-values of 2.854 and p-
value <0.05. The indirect effects of this path 95% boot CI Bias-corrected (LL=0.026, UL=0.113) do 
not straddle a ‘0’ value in between indicating there is a mediation effect [80], [85]. On the other hand, 
the path relationship between cash incentives to perceived behavioural control to intention is not 
significantly supported (β = 0.013, t = 0.634, p-value = 0.523). At the same time, the 95% boot CI 
Bias-corrected (LL= - 0.025, UL=0.054) shows that ‘0’ straddle in between indicating there is a no 
mediation effect [80], [85]. 
Thus, it can be concluded that perceived behavioural control significantly mediates the 
relationship between tax incentives towards the intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund. On 
the other hand, the mediation effect of PCB on cash incentives towards the intention to save in a 
voluntary retirement fund is not significant. Thus, the analysis supported hypotheses H1, while H2 is 
not significantly supported.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The mediation analysis shows how perceived behavioural control mediates the tax and cash incentive 
towards the intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund. The mediation analysis found a sufficient 
empirical support of the mediation effect of perceived behavioural control towards tax incentives and 
the intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund shown in the positive indirect effect  of the 
relationship. In other words, the analysis discovers that for most Malaysian, the tax incentives 
increases their control belief in accomplishing the task. On the other hand, the cash incentives are not 
significantly supported as mediating an individual perceived behavioural control enough to motivate 
their intention to save in a voluntary retirement as shown in the non-significant relationship in Table 
3.  
 
Retirement issue is multidimensional and will affect everyone and the country’s government alike. 
The failure to solve the retirement issues could lead to potential economic calamity. Around the 
world, the population trends growths will not be able to be supported by the traditional pension 
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systems, and efforts are made to transfer this responsibility towards the individual. In most cases, to 
increase the take up for this type of saving, governments will provide incentives as a mechanism to 
motivate savers and non-savers to save in the supplementary pension [4]. Research has found clear 
empirical evidence that financial incentive has a substantial impact of the form of saving, but not clear 
on the extent to which incentives provide a significant boost to overall savings [86]–[88].  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of incentives towards the intention to save in 
retirement saving as a mediating factor of perceived behavioural control. Taylor and Todd [78] 
warned that the absence of facilitating condition might represent barriers to behaviour and can inhibit 
the formation of intention, eventhough the presence of facilitating conditions may not encourage the 
behaviour. Citing Banterle [4], tax incentives do not trigger additional savings, but merely reduce the 
individual burden for a supplementary pension.   In this study financial incentives are treated as part 
of the facilitating condition that affected perceived behavioural control and not the intention of 
behaviour, which coincided with the DTPB theory.  
The financial incentives are divided into tax and cash incentive. The cash incentive is to 
provide immediate tangible benefits realised at purchase, while tax would have a delayed effect. Both 
are forms of winning effort design to increase retirement savings.  The mediation analysis using 
Preacher and Hayes [85] technique shows that tax incentives are significantly positive, while cash 
incentives are not in influencing the intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund. This show that 
the respondent is not moved with the immediate tangible benefit instead is more interested in saving 
because of tax incentives. Tax incentives will increase their control belief [89]. A simple conclusion 
possible from this is that those who have the money or have higher income will benefit more from this 
long-term savings. Accordingly, this research has also shown that the perceived control towards the 
intention of the respondent is high, and cash incentives do not motivate while tax incentives only 
achieved a low coefficient of determination. This study shows that incentives in terms of tax would be 
more effective in increasing a person intention to save in a voluntary retirement fund in Malaysia, 
through the effect towards perceived behavioural control which is in line with research that found a 
similar outcome [5], [7], [90], [91].  It is in contrast with other research which found another type of 
incentives would be more progressive such as matching a contribution [92]. 
At the same time, this study shows that the tax incentive is more effective compared to cash 
incentives to influence voluntary saving in the Malaysian context. It contributes extensively to the 
literature on retirement savings. Inferring that it supports much research that claims those who would 
save in a voluntary retirement fund are those having a higher income since they will benefit more 
from tax incentives. Based to the findings of this research, it is suggested that the policy makers 
should consider revisiting the incentives system and emphasize more on taxation in order to increase 
savings in voluntary retirement fund.  
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